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1A B S T R A C T
1Risk disclosure practices have received increasing attention in the wake 
of the 2008 global fi nancial crisis. This study investigated possible 
determinants relating to the composition of the board committee 
responsible for risk management, the frequency of board risk committee 
meetings and whether the company employs a chief risk offi cer, which 
could manifest in an enhanced level of risk-related disclosure. Based on 
the possible determinants identifi ed in the literature, nine hypotheses 
were developed in order to investigate which of these determinants 
relate to an enhanced level of risk disclosure by the selected companies. 
The fi rst required integrated reports of non-fi nancial companies in the 
Top 40 index of the JSE Securities Exchange were investigated in this 
study. Regarding one area of investigation, namely the level of risk 
management disclosure, it was found that the disclosure of companies 
whose risk committee met more frequently and the disclosure of 
companies that employed a chief risk offi cer, were of a relatively higher 
standard. With regard to the other area of investigation, namely the 
level of risk identifi cation and mitigation disclosure, no clearly signifi cant 
determinant of enhanced disclosure was identifi ed.
2Key words:  risk management; risk committee; risk disclosure; King III; risk identifi cation and 
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1It is widely acknowledged that risk reporting prior to the 2008 global financial crisis 
was inadequate (ICAEW 2011; Kirkpatrick 2009). In its report on risk disclosure, 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales (ICAEW 2011) 
provides three possible reasons for inadequate risk reporting:
• the requirements for risk reporting were insufficient;
• the requirements for risk reporting were sufficient, but managers, who were aware 
of the risks, chose not to disclose them; or
• the board of directors was either unaware of the risks, or completely underestimated 
them.
1No comprehensive set of guidelines is currently available on the disclosure of risk 
identification and risk management processes (Enslin, Bruwer & Viljoen 2015; 
Kirkpatrick 2009). With the exception of the disclosure of financial risk, which 
is regulated by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the level 
and content of risk reporting can be determined by the board of directors of each 
company. Kirkpatrick (2009) has argued that limited guidance on and requirements 
for risk disclosure have resulted in the inadequate management of risks by boards 
of directors. The responsibility for risk management and disclosure rests ultimately 
with the board of directors of companies (IOD 2009).
As a means to assist the board of directors in fulfilling its responsibility, King III 
(IOD 2009) stipulates the following:
The board should assign oversight of the company’s risk management function to an appropriate 
board committee (for example a risk committee or the audit committee). Membership of the risk 
committee should include executive and non-executive directors. Members of the risk commit-
tee, taken as a whole, should comprise people with adequate risk management skills and experi-
ence to equip the committee to perform its functions.
1The fact that this responsibility resides with the board of directors, and specifically 
the board committee to whom the responsibilities for risk management oversight 
are discharged, implies that the composition of the board committee on risk 
identification and risk management may have a significant influence on risk 
management and risk disclosure practices of companies.
Risk disclosure is of vital importance to investors, both equity investors as well 
as providers of loan capital, as these investors stand to lose money if the business in 
which they have invested fails. Investors do not have inside knowledge of the risks 
the business is facing, the tolerance levels of risk or the adequacy of risk management 
systems (FRC 2011). Investors require risk-related information in order to perform 
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their own risk assessment and calculate the return that would adequately compensate 
them for the risk relating to an investment in the business (Abraham & Cox 2007).
According to Maingot, Quon and Zéghal (2014), the level of risk disclosure by 
non-financial companies in the United States of America and Canada was only 
affected to a negligible extent by the 2008 global financial crisis. Hence if risk 
disclosure was inadequate before the financial crisis, it remains a problem that must 
be addressed and resolved. The problem is partly due to the fact that risk disclosure 
is largely unregulated. This problem of the inadequate level of risk disclosure forms 
the problem statement that necessitated the investigation conducted in this study.
Given the prevalence of inadequate risk and risk management disclosure, despite 
the importance of such disclosure, Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) stressed the need to 
determine the nature and determinants of risk reporting. The objective of this study 
was therefore to investigate determinants of risk disclosure relating to the composition 
of the board risk committees, the frequency of its meetings as well as a selection of 
company characteristics of companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. The 
factors relating to the board risk committee and other company characteristics were 
identified from previous research literature as possible determinants of the level of 
risk disclosure.
The Integrated Reporting Framework created by the International Integrated 
Reporting Council has set out risk and opportunities as one of the content elements 
of the integrated report (IIRC 2013). Accordingly, the first required integrated reports 
of non-financial companies in the Top 40 index of the JSE Securities Exchange were 
investigated in this study to identify which of the possible determinants correlated 
with higher quality risk reporting.
The aim of this study was to provide possible guidance to boards of directors on 
the optimal composition of their board risk committees, the frequency of its meetings 
and whether to appoint a chief risk officer. Investors could also benefit from a better 
understanding on determinants of enhanced risk disclosure, which could be an 
indication of enhanced risk management (Enslin et al. 2015).
Literature review and hypothesis development
1Although risk management and risk disclosure have received heightened research 
attention in recent years, research into factors pertaining to quality risk disclosure 
remains extremely limited (Miihkinen 2012). Investors have called for improved risk 
disclosure (ICAEW 2011) following the financial crisis which occurred during the 
latter part of the previous decade. In addition, investigations have been conducted 
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internationally into how risk management and risk disclosure could be improved 
(ICAEW 2011; FRC 2011).
The literature review is divided into two sections. This first section deals with the 
identification of a measurement tool suited to measuring the level of risk disclosure 
by South African listed companies. The second section relates to literature on the 
possible determinants of enhanced risk disclosure and the development of hypotheses 
based on the literature.
Disclosure index for measuring level of risk disclosure
1The Integrated Reporting Framework provides limited guidance on risk disclosure 
by suggesting that specific key risks should be disclosed (IIRC 2013). It also suggests 
that disclosure on each risk may include discussion of the source of the risk, the 
company’s assessment of the risk and the steps taken to mitigate the risk. However, 
specific details on risk management disclosure are not provided.
In its statement on management commentary, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB 2010) states the following:
Management should disclose an entity’s principal risk exposures and changes in those risks, 
together with its plans and strategies for bearing and mitigating those risks, as well as disclosure 
of the effectiveness of its risk management strategies.
1The above statement of the IASB should be supplemented with other guidelines 
on risk and risk management disclosure, as it does not deal specifically with the 
detail of risk and risk management disclosure. Other guidelines on risk and risk 
management disclosure provide fragmented guidance on disclosure.
Based on a review of the available guidelines, Enslin et al. (2015) compiled a 
risk disclosure index indicating current requirements in terms of leading guidelines. 
They segregated risk relating reporting into two categories for the purposes of the 
risk disclosure index, namely risk management related disclosure (see Table 1) and 
risk identification and mitigation related disclosure (see Table 2). This risk disclosure 
index provides a tool with which to measure the level of a company’s risk reporting.
Possible determinants of enhanced risk disclosure
1One area of risk-related research investigates possible factors that may determine 
improved risk management, as well as factors that may determine improved risk 
disclosure. The determinants of risk disclosure have been addressed in a number of 
studies  in  developed  countries, but investigation  into  determinants  in  developing
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Table 1: Risk disclosure index for risk management
iDisclosure iiSource
iiiNote that the full board is responsible for risk. ivKing III, SEC
vNote how the board is involved with regard to the company’s risk appetite or 
overall risk tolerance.
viSEC, King III
viiNote that the company has a chief risk offi  cer (CRO) or related position. viiiFRC
ixNote whether the CEO is responsible for risk management or how the CEO is 
involved.
xCOSO, SEC
xiNote whether a companywide corporate culture of risk management is being 
fostered.
xiiFRC, COSO
xiiiNote whether the company has a risk committee at management level. xivISO, COSO, SEC
xvDisclose whether risk management is aligned with the company’s strategy. xviFRC, COSO
xviiDisclose the main processes used by the risk management systems to identify 
risks. 
xviiiIRM
xixDisclose the monitoring and review system in place to ensure continued 
comprehensiveness and relevance of the risk management system.
xxIRM
xxiDisclose the board’s views on the eff ectiveness of the company’s risk management 
processes.
xxiiKing III
Source: Enslin et al. (2015)
Table 2: Risk disclosure index for risk and risk identifi cation
xxiiiDisclosure xxivSource
xxvDisclose principal risks, rather than listing all possible risks. xxviFRC, ICAEW
xxviiDisclose company-specifi c risks, rather than the reporting of general risks. xxviiiFRC
xxixProvide a discussion on each risk itself, rather than just cryptically listing the risk. xxxFRC, ICAEW
xxxiIndicate the cause of each risk, even if just general. xxxiiICAEW
xxxiiiNote the possible impact that the possible occurrence of the risk event may have 
on the company in general.
xxxivICAEW
xxxvSupport risk disclosure by quantitative disclosures. xxxviICAEW
xxxviiNote what impact the possible occurrence of the reported risks may have, 
specifi cally on the achievement of the company’s strategic objectives.
xxxviiiFRC
xxxixDisclose how principal reported risks are/were being mitigated. xlFRC
xliDisclose the company’s risk appetite, even if only to state whether the risk appetite 
is increasing or becoming more risk averse.
xliiKing III, FRC
xliiiExplain changes in the company’s risk exposure over the previous 12 months as a 
result of changes to the strategy or business environment.
xlivICAEW, FRC
xlvIndicate if the company’s risk exposure might change in the future, as a result of 
changes to the strategy or business environment.
xlviICAEW
Source: Enslin et al. (2015)
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1countries is limited (Mokhtar & Mellett 2013). Possible determinants for proper risk 
management and for adequate risk disclosure as identified in previous studies, will 
be discussed in the remainder of the literature review. The identified determinants 
will subsequently provide the theoretical base for the hypotheses in this study on 
the possible determinants for enhanced risk disclosure by companies listed in South 
Africa, a developing country.
Previous research has investigated the composition of the board and risk reporting 
(Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig 2011; Dobler, Lajili & Zéghal 2011; Mokhtar & Mellett 
2013). Although the board of directors is ultimately responsible for risk disclosure, this 
duty is delegated to either the audit or the risk committee of the board. According to 
King III (IOD 2009), the responsibility for risk management should only be assigned 
to the audit committee after considering whether the audit committee has sufficient 
resources to deal with risk governance, as well as with its audit responsibilities. As 
such, it makes more sense for the specific characteristics of the board committee 
responsible for risk and risk management to have a stronger relationship with the 
level of risk reporting by listed companies, than the characteristics of the board as a 
whole.
Separate board risk committee
1According to King III (IOD 2009), the board of directors should delegate the 
duty to design, implement and monitor the risk management plan of the entity to 
management. However, it remains the duty of the board to ensure that there are 
processes in place that will allow sufficient risk disclosure to stakeholders to enable 
them to make informed decisions (IOD 2009). Although the board of directors 
remains responsible for risk management, this function is delegated to a board sub-
committee (either the audit committee or a separate risk committee).
King III (IOD 2009) allows the audit committee to accept responsibility for 
internal auditing and risk management. However, it is clear from the wording, “this 
should be done with careful consideration to the resources available to adequately deal 
with risk governance in addition to its audit responsibilities”, that it would be preferable 
for a company to have a separate board sub-committee to deal with risk management.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United 
States of America and the Walker Review in the United Kingdom have highlighted 
the need for a board risk committee and the establishment of such a committee is 
increasingly becoming best practice at international level (Lawlor 2012; Ballou & 
Heitger 2008). Reputable frameworks for risk management, including the framework 
issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
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(COSO 2004), emphasise that risk management will fail in the absence of proper 
oversight. Brown, Steen and Foreman (2009) noted that, owing to the complexity of 
non-financial risks, it might not be possible for boards to rely on the audit committee 
alone to manage risk and that creating a separate risk management committee would 
be likely to improve risk management. According to Subramaniam, McManus and 
Zhang (2009), a board risk committee is a critical resource for boards to fulfil their 
responsibilities as far as risk management is concerned, but there is still a paucity of 
empirical evidence on the nature of these committees. It is therefore possible that 
the existence of a separate risk committee might be a determinant for improved risk 
disclosure practices.
The determinants of risk management disclosure could, theoretically, differ from 
those of risk identification and mitigation reporting. Risk management disclosure 
focuses on the processes which are largely prescribed by King III (IOD 2009) 
and enterprise-wide risk management systems. Risk identification and mitigation 
disclosure, however, are more subjective, with little directives that may serve as 
guidance. In the case of risk management disclosure, however, the existence of a 
separate risk committee is not as important, as the audit committee typically retains 
some risk-related duties and the internal audit function provides assurance on the 
risk management systems. A separate risk committee that focuses almost exclusively 
on risks and spends most of its time at meetings on this subject could, however, 
improve disclosure on risks and the mitigation thereof.
King III (IOD 2009) stipulates that the committee responsible for risk 
management should include both executive and non-executive directors, and should 
have a minimum of three members. The committee should meet at least twice a year 
and should consist of people with adequate risk management skills and experience.
The preferability of a separate board committee for risk management and 
disclosure is confirmed by various international studies (Lawlor 2012; Brown et al. 
2009; Atkinson 2008; Ballou & Heitger 2008). The first hypothesis therefore tested 
the relationship between the existence of a separate board risk committee and the 
level of risk disclosure. For the purposes of this study, a value of one was assigned 
to companies that had a separate risk committee and a value of zero assigned to 
companies in which the duties relating to risk identification, management and 
disclosure form part of the duties of a combined committee.
H
1
:  There is a positive relationship between the existence of a separate board committee 
for risk and risk management (RC) and the level of risk disclosure.
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Number of independent directors
1Independence, according to King III (IOD 2009), refers to “the absence of undue 
influence and bias which can be affected by the intensity of the relationship between the 
director and the company”.
Htay, Rashid, Adnan & Meera (2012) found that a higher percentage of 
independent directors on the board led to higher information disclosure. This could 
be extrapolated to the board committee. Whether the board committee tasked 
with risk management is a separate risk committee or is combined with another 
committee, for example, the audit committee, the number of independent directors 
on the committee may also lead to improved risk disclosure. According to Ismail and 
Rahman (2011), independent non-executive directors are of vital importance in order 
to provide balance on the board of directors and to monitor management. These 
directors will enhance their own reputation by increasing the quality of monitoring 
in the companies where they serve on the board of directors (Fama & Jensen 1983).
Independent non-executive directors on the board, as well as on the risk committee, 
are beneficial in order to reduce the agency problem (Abraham & Cox 2007). Agency 
conflict is a key issue to address when discussing the role of directors in a company 
and, in this case, specifically with regard to risk management. The reason for this 
is that, while more disclosure on risk might be beneficial to stakeholders such as 
shareholders and suppliers of finance, it might prove detrimental to the management 
team in charge of the day-to-day running of the company, who will also be evaluated 
on the basis of their performance as far as risk management is concerned.
Based on the resource dependency theory, directors are beneficial to a company 
as they provide knowledge, skills, expertise and contacts to the company. Directors 
who also have a link with outsiders should have access to external resources that 
could enhance performance (Ismail & Rahman 2011). The presence of a company’s 
directors on the boards of other companies can also improve access to information 
that could be utilised to the advantage of the company (Kyereboah-Coleman 2008). 
However, Ismail and Rahman (2011) found that risk management disclosure is 
negatively correlated with the number of independent, non-executive directors, and 
they could not find a significant relationship between risk management disclosure 
and the number of non-independent, non-executive directors.
Abraham and Cox (2007) found that the number of executive and independent, 
non-executive directors was positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting, 
but not the number of dependent, non-executive directors. Owing to their connection 
with the company, non-independent directors’ judgements could be influenced by 
management. This underlines the importance of independent directors in good 
corporate governance.
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The quality of decision making and strategic direction for the company could be 
influenced by outside directors (Pearce II & Zahra 1992). Rahman and Ali (2006) 
found that independent, non-executive directors ensure enhanced monitoring. The 
findings of Cheng and Courtenay (2006), that companies with a higher number of 
independent directors have a higher level of voluntary disclosure, provide support for 
the positive influence of independent directors. However, contrary to the arguments 
above, Haat, Rahman and Mahenthiran (2008) and Dionne and Triki (2005) found 
that the number of independent directors does not have an effect on risk management.
However, in this study, it was found that some companies nominated only 
independent directors on the specific committee charged with the responsibility 
of risk, but the executive directors attended all the meetings as invitees. It is thus 
possible that the official proportion of independent directors could be misleading, 
as the executive directors would certainly play a significant role in the meetings. 
It was therefore decided to use the number of independent directors on the board 
committee tasked with risk and risk management as the independent variable. It is 
argued that the greater the number of independent directors is, the more power these 
gatekeepers, who fulfil the monitoring role and protect the stakeholders’ interests, 
should have in meetings. Boards with more independent directors are more effective 
in monitoring management, thus also reducing agency problems.
H
2
:  There is a positive relationship between the number of independent directors on the 
board committee (#IndD) and the level of risk disclosure.
Variation in experience
1Diversity, as far as the skills and level of experience of directors (especially non-
executive directors) are concerned, enhances the effectiveness of a committee as 
it provides alternative perspectives on strategy and risk (Tyson 2003). McIntyre, 
Murphy and Mitchell (2007) supported the view that the levels of experience of 
directors may influence the performance of the board, which may also be true for 
board committees. Accordingly, a study conducted by Xie, Davidson III and DaDalt 
(2003) concluded that there is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and the 
number of experienced directors on the board. However, Ismail and Rahman (2011) 
and Rahman and Ali (2006) found that there is a negative relationship between risk 
management disclosure and the existence of experienced directors on the board.
Experience is measured by the number of years the independent director has served 
on the board of the specific company. Variation in experience could be beneficial to 
risk reporting, as directors with different levels of experience should have different 




:  There is a positive relationship between the variation in the experience of the 
independent directors on the board committee (VarIDExp) and the level of risk 
disclosure.
1Variation in experience refers to the difference in experience between the various 
independent directors serving on the committee of the specific company. The 
measurement of variation is based on the standard deviation of experience.
Variation in age
1McIntyre et al. (2007) also studied the average age of the directors on the board, as 
well as the variation in their age. Their study found that high levels of experience, 
but with moderate levels of variation in age and team tenure, were correlated with 
improved firm performance. McIntyre et al. (2007) proposed that optimal boards 
should, firstly, possess moderate diversity along key dimensions, such as tenure and 
age; secondly, only be large enough to ensure that the task required is completed 
with the required resources and capabilities; thirdly, have medium team tenure; and 
fourthly, have experienced membership.
Their findings support the view that team design is indeed necessary for the 
effective functioning of boards of directors. These requirements could also be made 
applicable to the board committee charged with managing risk. The reasoning 
behind this investigation into the variation in age of the directors on the committee 
is that disclosure should improve along with an increase in age variation, as different 
viewpoints and experience will be represented by a wider spectrum of ages.
H4:   There is a positive relationship between the variation in the age of the independent 
directors on the board committee (VarIDAge) and the level of risk disclosure.
1Variation in age refers to the difference in age between the various independent 
directors serving on the committee of the specific company. The measurement of 
variation is based on the standard deviation of age.
Number of meetings
1The number of meetings of the board (as well as those of the audit committee) 
is indicative of its effective functioning, as well as how often relevant issues are 
addressed (Dey 2008). However, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) found that the 
number of annual audit committee meetings is slightly negatively correlated with 
company value. Although Brick and Chidambaran’s (2010) study related audit 
committee meetings to firm value, it could indicate, in contradiction of Dey’s (2008) 
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argument that the number of committee meetings may not necessarily result in 
more effective functioning.
The number of meetings held by the committee charged with the responsibility 
of risk should influence the level of risk reporting in the integrated report. The more 




:  There is a positive relationship between the number of meetings of the board 
committee (#Meet) and the level of risk disclosure.
Designated chief risk offi cer
1King III (IOD 2009) states that the chief risk officer should be a suitable and 
experienced person who should have access to the board and interact with them 
(as well as executive management and the relevant board committees) on a regular 
basis with regard to strategic risk matters. In their investigation into determinants 
of companies’ enterprise risk management adoption, Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) 
found, however, that companies with a chief risk officer did not have a significantly 
higher adoption rate. The need for a chief risk officer may indeed be debatable as 
risk management capabilities should be evident across all levels of management in 
an entity and should be integrated throughout (KPMG 2001). However, Liebenberg 
and Hoyt (2003) did find that companies with higher leverage were more likely to 
employ a chief risk officer. They interpreted this phenomenon to be indicative of the 
fact that companies facing greater financial risk require a chief risk officer to, inter 
alia, communicate the company’s risk profile effectively to external stakeholders. In 
accordance with the Liebenberg and Hoyt’s (2003) interpretation mentioned above, 
having a chief risk officer in office should improve risk disclosure. A value of one 
was assigned to companies that had a designated risk officer, and a value of zero 
assigned to companies that did not indicate that they had a designated risk officer.
H
6
:  There is a positive relationship between the appointment of a specifically designated 
chief risk officer at management level (RO) and the level of risk disclosure.
1Additional company-related factors that could be determinants of enhanced risk 
disclosure are discussed below.
Size of the company
1Amran, Bin and Hassan (2008) argued that the larger the company is, the larger the 
number of stakeholders involved with the company is. The duty of disclosure thus 
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increases as the company grows, because the information needs of a larger number 
of people must be satisfied. It can also be said that the larger the company is, the 
more resources it has available to ensure that better risk management systems are 
implemented within the company. This should lead to improved information for 
disclosure purposes. Previous studies on risk or other voluntary disclosure proved 
a positive association between company size and level of disclosure. Oliveira et 
al. (2011), Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011), Khodadadi, Khazami and Aflatooni 
(2010), Amran et al. (2008) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) all confirmed the 
positive relationship between the size of a company and risk disclosure. However, 
Hassan, Giorgioni and Romilly (2006) found a negative relationship between 
company size and improved disclosure practices, while Hassan (2009) and Mokhtar 
and Mellet (2013) found the relationship between the size of the company and risk 
disclosure to be insignificant. Mokhtar and Mellet (2013) suggest that a possible 
explanation for this conflict with the literature could be that the role of the size of a 
company differs between developed economies and developing economies, with less 
mature reporting systems.
According to a study by Ismail and Rahman (2011), company size (defined by 
the logarithm of total assets) has a significant effect on risk management disclosure. 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) also determined that company size is positively related 
to the level of voluntary disclosure.
In addition, agency cost is typically higher in larger companies, and increased 
agency cost should lead to greater monitoring and risk management (Carcello, 
Hermanson & Raghunandan 2005; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006). The size of the 
company is thus a vital control variable that should be included (Subramaniam et al. 
2009).
A number of studies have determined that the size of a company is an important 
factor as far as risk management is concerned (Oliveira et al. 2011; Subramanian et 
al. 2009; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). Many different ratios, such as the following, 
have been used in previous studies to provide an indication of company size:
• The natural logarithm of sales revenue was used as an indication of company size 
(Dey 2008).
• The book value of total assets at the end of the prior financial year was utilised 
(Brick & Chidambaran 2008).
• The size of the company, calculated by using the logarithm of total assets, 
was used. Data was logged to minimise the possible impact of extreme values 
(Abraham & Cox 2007; Ibrahim & Samad 2011).
• Amran et al. (2008) defined size by using the turnover of the company.
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• The logarithm of total assets of the company, as well as the logarithm of annual 
sales, was used. Both values were logged to minimise the effect of extreme values 
(Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & Ojah 2010).
1In this study, the logarithm of total assets was used as an indication of company size.
H
7
:  There is a positive relationship between the size of a company (Size) and the level of 
risk disclosure.
Profi tability
1Profitable firms have incentives to distinguish themselves from less profitable firms 
in order to motivate shareholders to invest in them, rather than in less profitable 
firms (Meek et al. 1995). Accordingly, profitable companies are motivated to 
disclose more information in order to satisfy shareholders, to enhance the image 
of the company and to increase the marketability of shares and justify managers’ 
compensation. However, in their investigation into determinants of the level of 
voluntary disclosure by companies, Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Ojah (2010) found 
that higher profitability does not necessarily lead to companies disclosing more 
voluntary information.
In this study on risk identification and mitigation reporting, profit (as defined by 
net profit after tax, as a percentage of total assets) was used as a control variable. This 
is because the business and operational risks that directly impact on profits are those 
that are identified and being reported on. More profitable companies might be more 
willing to disclose their major risks in more detail. However, it is also possible that 
less profitable companies could be motivated to reveal more relating to their risks and 
risk mitigation, in order to attract new investors.
Profitability was calculated by using net profit after tax/total assets, in accordance 
with the study by Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Ojah (2010).
H8:  There is a positive relationship between profitability (Profit) and the level of risk 
disclosure.
Industry
1Amran et al. (2008) found a significant relationship between the nature of the 
industry in which a company operates and its risk disclosure. The more risks an 
industry is exposed to, the greater the exposure will be – hence the higher the 
required level of risk disclosure. Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Ojah (2010) reported 
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that the industry in which a company operates is a significant factor in voluntary 
disclosure.
In this study, a dummy variable was created in order to determine whether risk 
reporting was influenced by the industry in which a company operates. Owing to 
the limitation of the sample size, it was decided to limit the distinction between 
industries to companies in extractive industries and companies operating outside the 
extractive industries. Extractive companies are broadly defined as companies involved 
in the mining industry, while the rest of the population consisted of companies not 
involved in mining. Extractive industries are exposed to comparatively higher safety, 
regulatory or ecological risks (FRC 2011). A value of one was assigned to extractive 
companies and a value of zero to non-extractive companies.
H9:  The level of risk disclosure depends on the industry in which the company trades 
(Extract).
Research method
1The level of risk reporting by the 29 non-financial companies in the JSE Top 40 
index was measured using the disclosure index developed by Enslin et al. (2015). 
Information on the possible determinants of enhanced risk reporting, which were 
identified in the literature review, was collected for all the selected companies. 
Based on a post-positivist research paradigm, a quantitative method was used to 
develop statistical models to indicate which of the possible determinants explained 
differences in the level of risk disclosure within the sample. The results of the 
forward stepwise regression models indicated which of the hypotheses developed 
in the literature review could not be rejected. The determinants relating to the 
hypotheses which were not rejected, were accepted as determinants of enhanced 
risk-related disclosure in the sample.
Population and sampling
1The population for this study included all the companies listed on the JSE Securities 
Exchange in South Africa. A non-random, purposive sample was selected for 
investigation. The sample consisted of the non-financial companies in the Top 40 
index of the JSE as on 1 March 2011. Selecting a sample consisting of the Top 
40 index of companies was consistent with previous studies (Barac & Moloi 2010; 
Marx & Voogt 2010; Enslin et al. 2015). Financial companies were excluded as they 
operate under different rules and regulations, including those pertaining to risk 
management and disclosure. The integrated reports of the sample companies for 
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their financial years ending on or between 31 March 2011 and 29 February 2012 
were selected for the analysis. This represents the first reporting period for which 
each of these companies was required to submit an integrated report in accordance 
with King III (IOD 2009), as required by the JSE listing requirements (JSE n.d.). 
This is significant because King III (IOD 2009) requires risk and risk management-
related disclosure in the integrated report. Investigating the first integrated reports 
also provides a baseline against which future investigations may be compared. This 
study therefore included 29 companies in total.
Dependent variable
1Disclosure of risk management as one dependent variable and risk identification 
and mitigation as a second dependent variable were measured by means of a risk 
disclosure index compiled by Enslin et al. (2015) from the requirements and 
guidelines contained in the reports of Deloitte (2012), FRC (2011), ICAEW (2011), 
IASB (2010), SEC (2009), ISO (2009) and IRM (2002), as well as the requirements 
of King III (IOD 2009).
The requirements and guidelines for reporting on risk were categorised as follows, 
in accordance with the disclosure index by Enslin et al (2105): disclosure on the risk 
management processes (Table 1 in the literature review section), and disclosure on 
risks identified and mitigation thereof (Table 2 in the literature review section). For 
each requirement that was disclosed, a value of one was awarded, and in the absence 
of its disclosure, a value of zero awarded. The index score was therefore a measure 
of the level of reporting, but not necessarily the quality of the disclosure (Beattie, 
McInnes & Fearnley 2004). Owing to the fact that an ordinal scale for the presence 
or absence of an item was used, indicating only whether or not a company satisfied 
and complied with a specific requirement on the risk disclosure index, no weighting 
was done. Ordinal results allow categorisation of data according to a selected rank 
which helps to describe differences between data; in this instance, how many 
companies complied with each specific requirement. Weighting was not necessary, 
as the disclosure index in this study was not developed from the preferences of a 
specific group of stakeholders (Marston & Shrives 1991). Previous studies also found 
that weighted and unweighted scores showed similar results (Khodadadi et al. 2010; 
Marston & Shrives 1991). As each requirement was equally important, an unweighted 
approach was followed (Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & Ojah 2010).
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Independent and control variables
1According to Mokoaleli-Mokoteli and Ojah (2010), independent variables must, 
firstly, be related to the disclosure; secondly, they should be easily measured; and, 
thirdly, data should be available on that corporate characteristic. These requirements 
were considered in the development of the independent variables. The nine possible 
determinants of enhanced risk disclosure which were identified from the literature 
were selected as the independent variables to identify which possible determinants 
explain differences in the level of risk reporting by sample companies.
Development of models
1The two dependent variables, risk management disclosure, and risk identification 
and mitigation disclosure could hypothetically be explained by various characteristics 
of the risk committee and other risk management specifics of the company. As the 
number of observations was small, over-fitting of the models being developed 
posed a real risk. Although R2 could be made much higher by the addition of 
more variables, the models could not be significant as a result of over-fitting. The 
independent variables that were studied all had a theoretical causal association with 
the dependent variables and, as such, the researchers did not wish to omit any of 
them in the development of the models. It was therefore decided to use forward 
stepwise regression, limiting the number of variables that could be included in the 
models, so that only the independent variables which improve the various models 
would form part of the model. This ensured that only the dependent variables with 
the most explanatory power and that added the most value to the study and to the 
results were included in the end results.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics
1Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables 
and Table 4 for the categorical independent variables. Two companies did not report 
on any aspect of the disclosure index for risk identification and mitigation, and they 
were therefore not included in the development of the models for risk identification 
and mitigation. This resulted in 29 observations for risk management disclosure 
and 27 observations for risk identification and mitigation disclosure. From the 
descriptive statistics it is evident that the presence of risk management disclosure 
was more prevalent than the disclosure of risk identification and mitigation. The 
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p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests for the dependent variables were all 
larger than 20%, which indicates that there was not enough evidence to infer that 
the data was not normally distributed.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables
xlviiVariable xlviiiModel xlixn lMean liMedian liiMin liiiMax livStandard 
deviation
lv#IndD lviRisk management
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1Table 4 contains the information on the categorical independent variables. Only 34% 
of all the companies had a separate risk committee at board level; the other companies 
combined the responsibility of risk with the audit committee’s responsibilities. The 
majority (66%) of the companies did not have a manager appointed specifically as 
a risk officer. Note that the two companies that did not comply with any of the risk 
identification and mitigation disclosure investigated in this study did not have a 
separate risk committee and also did not have a specific risk officer.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of categorical independent variables
cxlvVariable cxlviModel cxlviin cxlviiiNumber 0 cxlixNumber 1
clRC cliRisk management

























1The Pearson correlation coefficient is indicated in Table 5. This indicates the 
correlation between the dependent and the independent variable. There was a 
positive significant correlation (at a 5% level) between risk management disclosure 
and the number of meetings as well as the appointment of a specific risk officer 
at a company level. Extractive companies had a significant correlation with risk 
management disclosure at a 10% level. None of the independent variables indicated 
a significant correlation with risk identification and mitigation disclosure.
Table 5: Correlation between the dependent and the independent variables









cciProfi t ccii0.017 cciii0.319
ccivExtract ccv*0.357 ccvi-0.110
** Signifi cant at a 5% level/*signifi cant at a 10% level
1The correlation between the independent variables was also tested. There was a 
significant correlation at a 10% level for risk management disclosure between 
VarIDExp and VarIDAge. These two variables also had a significant correlation at a 
5% level for risk identification and mitigation. For this reason, it was decided not to 
use VarIDAge in the development of the regression models.
Regression models for risk and risk management disclosure
1In Table 6, the two models developed for risk management (Model 1) as well as 
risk identification and mitigation disclosure (Model 2) are summarised. Model 
1 was significant at a 1% level, with an R2 of 0.478 and an adjusted R2 of 0.365. 
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The very small p-value (0.007) and the high f-statistic of 4.218 confirm the overall 
significance of the model. Model 2 for risk and mitigation was not significant and 
resulted in an R2 of 0.229 and an adjusted R2 of just 0.129. The low adjusted R2 
(especially as far as risk identification and mitigation is concerned) is an indication 
that other factors strongly influenced disclosure with regard to risk management, as 
well as risk identification and mitigation.










































































***  Signifi cant at a 1% level/** signifi cant at a 5% level/* signifi cant at a 10% level / n/a – variable not included in 
model
1Forward stepwise regression involves testing the action of a variable by the use 
of specific comparison criteria. The variable will only be added if it improves the 
model. By conducting this process, two of the independent variables, #IndD and 
RC, were excluded from the models as their addition did not improve the models.
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Discussion of fi ndings
Table 7: Summary of hypotheses and fi ndings
cclxxixHypothesis tested cclxxxFinding
cclxxxiH1 cclxxxiiThere a positive relationship between the 
existence of a separate board committee for risk 
management and the level of risk disclosure. 
cclxxxiiiHypothesis rejected. No statistically signifi cant 
relationship could be found at a 1%, 5% or 
10% level of signifi cance. 
cclxxxivH2 cclxxxvThere is a positive relationship between the 
number of independent directors on the board 
committee and the level of risk disclosure.
cclxxxviHypothesis rejected. No statistically signifi cant 
relationship could be found at a 1%, 5% or 
10% level of signifi cance. 
cclxxxviiH3 cclxxxviiiThere is a positive relationship between the 
variation in experience of the independent 
directors on the board committee and the level 
of risk disclosure.
cclxxxixHypothesis rejected. No statistically signifi cant 
relationship could be found at a 1%, 5% or 
10% level of signifi cance.
ccxcH4 ccxciThere is a positive relationship between the 
variation in age of the independent directors 
on the board committee and the level of risk 
disclosure.
ccxciiNot included as variation in age and 
experience of independent directors had a 
signifi cant correlation. 
ccxciiiH5 ccxcivThere is a positive relationship between the 
number of meetings of the board committee 
and the level of risk disclosure.
ccxcvFail to reject hypothesis. 10% level of signifi cance 
for risk management. No signifi cant 
relationship for risk identifi cation and 
mitigation can currently be accepted*. 
ccxcviH6 ccxcviiThere is a positive relationship between the 
appointment of a specifi cally designated risk 
offi  cer at a management level and the level of 
risk disclosure.
ccxcviiiFail to reject hypothesis for risk management. 
There was a 5% level of signifi cance for risk 
management. No signifi cant relationship for 
risk identifi cation and mitigation at a 1%, 5% 
or 10% level.
ccxcixH7 cccThere is a positive relationship between the size 
of the company and the level of risk disclosure.
ccciHypothesis rejected. No statistically signifi cant 
relationship could be found at a 1%, 5% or 
10% level of signifi cance.
ccciiH8 ccciiiThere is a positive relationship between 
profi tability and the level of risk disclosure.
cccivHypothesis rejected. No signifi cant 
relationship for risk management at a 1%, 5% 
or 10% level of signifi cance. No signifi cant 
relationship for risk identifi cation and 
mitigation can currently be accepted*.
cccvH9 cccviThe level of risk disclosure depends on the 
industry in which the company trades.
cccviiHypothesis rejected. No statistically signifi cant 
relationship could be found at a 1%, 5% or 
10% level of signifi cance.
1*  With reference to risk identifi cation and mitigation, the number of risk committee meetings and the profi tability 
level indicated a possible signifi cant correlation with enhanced risk disclosure in the development of the stepwise 
regression model (Table 6). However, the fi nal model on risk identifi cation and mitigation (Model 2) did not 
signifi cantly explain the independent variable, and the Pearson correlation coeffi  cient in Table 5 also did not 
indicate any signifi cant correlation between the number of risk committee meetings and profi tability variables, 
with the level of risk identifi cation and mitigation disclosure. The number of risk committee meetings and the 
profi tability level of the company could not therefore currently be accepted as variables that signifi cantly infl uence 
the level of risk identifi cation and mitigation disclosure. Further research, possibly with larger samples, would be 
required in this area.
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No statistically significant relationship between the dependent variables and the 
level of risk identification and mitigation, and risk management disclosure were 
found, except for the following:
• The number of board risk committee meetings had a significant influence on the 
level of risk reporting for risk management disclosure.
• The appointment of a designated risk officer had a significant influence on the 
level of risk management disclosure.
1This study found no significant difference in the level of risk disclosure by companies 
with a separate board risk committee and those with only an audit committee also 
responsible for risk management. Because this study focused on JSE Securities 
Exchange Top 40 companies, it is possible that the audit committees of these 
‘larger’ companies currently do have the resources available to also perform their 
risk identification and management responsibilities at a satisfactory level. The audit 
committees of smaller companies, that may only have access to limited resources, 
may find it more difficult to also perform risk identification and management duties. 
Indeed Brown et al. (2009) recommend that the risk and audit committee should be 
separated because of the widening of the scope and the increased importance of risk 
management, and changes in corporate governance.
In agreement with the findings of Dionne and Triki (2005) and Haat et al. (2008), 
this study did not find a significant relationship between the number of independent 
directors and risk disclosure. This is in contrast to the study by Abraham and Cox 
(2007), who reported a significant relationship between corporate risk reporting 
disclosure and the number of independent directors on the board.
As some companies within the sample indicated that executive directors 
attended all the risk committee meetings as invitees, the extent of the influence 
of the independent directors in the discussions of the committee could have been 
diluted. This dilution could be a factor contributing to the finding that the number 
of independent directors did not show a significant relationship with the level of risk 
disclosure. However, this suggestion is preliminary and warrants further investigation 
in future research.
There was no significant relationship between the variation in experience 
of directors and the level of risk management disclosure. This is in line with the 
findings of Rahman and Ali (2006) and Ismail and Rahman (2011). In addition, no 
significant relationship between variation in age of directors and risk disclosure was 
evident. This is in contrast with the findings of a study by McIntyre et al. (2007), 
who found that high levels of experience, as well as moderate levels of variation in 
age, were indeed correlated with firm performance. Risk management and related 
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risk disclosure practices are still evolving in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 
Accordingly, it would seem that directors have not yet had enough time to gain 
distinctive skills and knowledge relating to risk identification and management and 
the disclosure thereof.
This study indicated that the number of meetings held by the board committee 
responsible for risk management had a significant influence on risk management 
disclosure (but not conclusively for risk identification and mitigation). Dey (2008) 
proposed that the number of meetings was indicative of how regularly the board 
attended to certain issues. It was found that it is necessary for the board committee 
responsible for risk and risk management to meet regularly. The optimal frequency 
of meetings would be an area for further research.
Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005) found that the presence of a chief risk 
officer was positively related to the level of enterprise risk management in a company. 
This study indicated that the appointment of a chief risk officer had a significant 
effect on risk management disclosure. However, companies employing a chief risk 
officer should heed KPMG’s (2001) argument that risk management should be a 
company-wide practice and not be deemed the sole responsibility of a designated 
officer or department.
In line with the findings of Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Hassan (2009), it 
was found that there is a non-significant relationship between firm size and risk 
disclosure. South Africa is indeed a developing economy in line with Egypt (Mokhtar 
& Mellet 2013) and the United Arab Emirates (Hassan 2009). However, Mokhtar and 
Mellet’s (2013) explanation that this could be the influence of less mature reporting 
systems does not hold because South Africa has a mature corporate reporting system 
as a first global implementer of integrated reporting. The anomaly in the literature 
between studies in developed economies and studies in developing economies would 
be a possible area for further research.
Furthermore, in line with the findings of Mokolaleli-Mokoteli and Ojah (2010), 
no relationship was evident between the profitability of the company and its risk 
management disclosure. However, in contrast, Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994) 
and Owusu-Ansah (1998) reported a positive relationship between profitability and 
voluntary disclosure. Meek et al. (1995) suggested that profitable companies have 
incentives to distinguish themselves from less profitable companies to enhance 
their attractiveness as investments. The board may therefore wish to distinguish the 
company from others in terms of the level to which risks appear to be mitigated, by 
means of an increased level of risk identification and mitigation disclosure. This 
study found inconclusive evidence that a company’s level of profitability may be 
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related to its level of risk identification and mitigation disclosure. Hence, owing to 
conflicting views in the literature on this topic, further research should be conducted.
The industry in which a company trades does not have a significant influence 
on risk reporting. Extract was entered as a variable in both models, indicating that 
the level of risk disclosure would depend on the industry. However, this variable 
was not found to be significant. Studies by Mokhtar and Mellett (2013), Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) and Amran et al. (2009) also reported no differences in risk and 
disclosure practice between different industries. However, the limited distinction in 
terms of type of industry in this study was a limitation and could be an indication 
that improved models could be developed, based on industry-specific data as some 
other studies found a significant relationship between risk disclosure and industry 
classification (Hassan 2009; Oliveira et al. 2011).
Conclusion, limitations and areas for future research
1From the literature on risk disclosure, it is clear that risk and risk management 
disclosure has gained increased attention on account of the deficiencies exposed 
in this regard by the recent financial crisis. However, limited guidance is available 
on how companies can seek to achieve better risk and risk management disclosure, 
based on factors distinguishing companies with a good level of disclosure from 
companies with a lower level of disclosure. This study investigated the effect that the 
composition of the board committee tasked with risk management, the frequency of 
its meetings, as well as certain other company characteristics, had on the disclosure 
of risk management, as well as on risk identification and mitigation disclosure 
during the first reporting period that integrated reporting became compulsory for 
JSE Securities Exchange-listed companies.
The results of a forward stepwise regression indicated that the number of meetings 
of the board committee responsible for risk during the year had a significant effect 
on risk management disclosure. Risk management disclosure was also significantly 
influenced by whether the company had a designated risk officer. As far as risk 
identification and risk mitigation was concerned, the number of risk committee 
meetings and the level of profitability of a company indicated the possibility of 
significant influence. However, the evidence in this study of the significance of these 
two variables was inconclusive and warrants further research. These findings represent 
a baseline against which future research on risk and risk management disclosure 
in integrated reports could be compared. It is anticipated that, as companies adjust 
to the evolution of risk and risk management disclosure and integrated reporting, 
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distinguishing factors may develop that could not yet be identified in the current 
study.
Owing to this study’s small sample size of 29 non-financial companies that form 
part of the Top 40 companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange, generalisation 
of the results to other companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange should be 
restricted.
In addition to performing longitudinal studies over time, a number of other areas 
for future research were listed in the discussion of the findings. These areas include 
investigating the optimal frequency of meetings of the board committees responsible 
for risk and risk management, investigating whether the number of independent 
directors on the board has a more significant influence on risk and risk management 
disclosure than the number of independent directors on the risk committee, and 
expanding the sample size in order to, inter alia, investigate the possible differences 
in risk and risk management disclosure between different industries in greater depth.
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